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Preface 

My Lai: March 16th 1968
 
Early in the morning of March 16, 1968, the men of Company C, 1st Battalion, 
20th Infantry, Task Force Barker, Americal Division, loaded onto helicopters, believing 
they were headed for battle in the Vietnamese hamlet of My Lai.1  When they landed at 
My Lai, this company was an anonymous group of soldiers, just like any of the thousands 
of nineteen and twenty year olds the United States had sent to fight in Southeast Asia.  By 
nightfall these young men had committed actions that ensured the singular infamy of 
their unit, which is now remembered by the simpler name of “Charlie Company”. 
After slogging through the jungles of Quang Ngai province for three months 
without any large-scale contact with the enemy, the soldiers of Charlie Company 
believed they were finally on their way into a direct confrontation in a Viet Cong 
stronghold. Their commander, Captain Ernest Medina, a well-respected career soldier in 
his thirties, had briefed the men on the mission the night before.  Their objective was to 
eradicate the 48th Vietcong Battalion, with an estimated strength of at least 250 men, 
which intelligence believed was in the village My Lai 4.2  In addition to wiping out the 
48th Battalion, Medina instructed the men to destroy everything that might be of use to 
the enemy: wells that could provide them with water, crops and livestock that could feed 
them, and structures that could shelter them.3 
1 Gershen, Destroy or Die 13 
2 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 98 
3 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 98 
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When Charlie Company entered the village they encountered only unarmed 
civilians. Nonetheless, the soldiers destroyed My Lai and carried out a massacre claimed 
the lives of hundreds of noncombatants, including women, children, and the elderly.
vi 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Introduction 
When it comes to the Vietnam War, for me it’s not just history.  It’s personal. My 
dad was sent to Vietnam when he was nineteen years old, two years younger than I am as 
I write this. The year and a half he spent at war changed him irrevocably.  It was the 
catalyst in his life that uprooted him, radicalized him, and taught him to seek to 
understand things past the surface.  It is also a continuing source of resentment toward 
hawkish politicians and suspicion of authority. Trying to understand my dad has led me
into an uncomfortable fascination with the Vietnam War.  It is not a fascination with the 
timelines, important political figures, battles, or statistics.  It is a drive to know how it felt 
to be a nineteen-year-old American boy in Vietnam, and to understand what the war did 
to the young men that fought in it. 
Dad once told me, “those guys at My Lai were no different from me.  They just 
had the wrong circumstances.”4  He believes that in the environment American soldiers 
lived in, normal people could be led to commit unimaginable atrocities.  Although the 
men of Charlie Company had a larger dose of the circumstances of Vietnam than most, 
many things that can be said about the experience of Charlie Company could be said of 
any American soldier in Vietnam.  Their story is the worst possible case, but in its 
essential elements it is the story of all of the soldiers in Vietnam.   
4 Maxwell, interview 
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There is a very simple fact about the nature of war that is often overlooked: it is 
difficult for people to kill other people. Giving a man training, a uniform, and a gun does 
not alter his nature. Soldiers still values their own lives, as well as the lives of their 
friends and loved ones. For most, the idea of taking life strongly disconcerting. This is 
what U.S. Army Historian S. L. A. Marshall was referring to when he wrote: 
The average healthy individual…has such an inner and usually unrealized
resistance towards killing a fellow man that he will not of his own volition take 
life if it is possible to turn away from that responsibility….  At the vital point he 
becomes a conscientious objector.5 
Marshall had conducted a mammoth study of firing rates in U.S. combat 
infantrymen during World War Two, and found surprising, but remarkably consistent 
results. His study concluded that “only 15 to 20 percent of the American riflemen in 
combat during World War Two would fire at the enemy.”6  The other 80 to 85 percent 
were not cowards. They did not run away or hide, but in fact were often willing to risk 
their lives to rescue others, or run messages.  Yet these men “simply would not fire their 
weapons at the enemy, even when faced with repeated waves of bonzai charges.”7 
Marshall had discovered “the simple and demonstrable fact that there is within most men 
an intense resistance to killing their fellow man.  A resistance so strong that, in many 
circumstances, soldiers on the battlefield will die before they can overcome it.”8 
Yet the killings carried out by Charlie Company in My Lai stand in stark contrast 
to this fact. Their killing spree was a methodical mass-execution.  For four hours they 
5 Grossman, On Killing 2 
6 Grossman, On Killing 4 
7 Grossman, On Killing 4 
8 Grossman, On Killing 4 
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tore apart the village, some committing mutilations, beatings, and rapes as they went.  
They herded people into ditches so they could more efficiently fire into their masses.  
Their calculated violence did not even spare children or babies.  The unfathomable horror 
of the My Lai Massacre demands that we ask how it could happen.  How was the human 
resistance to killing in the boys from so Charlie Company so completely destroyed?  
What made this transformation so total and utterly complete that they were able to kill
500 unarmed and unresisting civilians? 
Many factors contributed to the ultimate reality that made monsters out of men.  
The My Lai Massacre was a product of the nature of the Vietnam War, not the individual 
men that carried it out.  While the scope of the massacre at My Lai was unprecedented, 
atrocity was the rule rather than the exception in Vietnam.  This thesis tells the story of 
how the Vietnam War eroded the morals, and ultimately the humanity, of the men of 
Charlie Company. Because the soldiers that carried out the My Lai Massacre were acting 
out roles they had been conditioned to play by the American way of war, the atrocity 
should not be seen as a series of crimes by crazed individuals, but as a manifestation of 
the broader dynamic of brutality toward civilians that pervaded the Vietnam War.
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Chapter One 

The United States in Vietnam 

Vietnam is still with us.  It has created doubts about American judgment, about American credibility, about 
American power – not only at home, but throughout the world.9 – Henry Kissinger
Our names for wars reveal a lot about how we remember them.  World War One 
was called “the Great War,” at the time, and Woodrow Wilson dubbed it “the War to End 
All Wars”.  These names are a reflection for the unprecedented scale of killing, and the 
rethinking of the international system the conflicts provoked.  World War Two was the 
“good war,” a struggle against the evil of fascist aggression.  Korea is “the forgotten 
war,” perhaps because it ended in stalemate, or perhaps because it too closely followed 
the dramatics of World War Two.  Where does this leave Vietnam?  It is the only war the 
United States has lost. It eventually divided the country rather than uniting it.  It forced 
the country to reexamine its place in the world community.  Was it “the bad war,” “the 
wrong war,” or even “the war of disillusionment?”
Vietnam may have been the wrong war, a conflict we entered because American 
policy makers insisted on seeing the war through the prism of the Cold War.  Vietnam
historian Robert Schulzinger points out that “The war in Vietnam was never strictly about 
Vietnam for the Americans who directed it, fought in it, or opposed it.  The United States 
became involved in Vietnamese politics and eventually fought in Vietnam because of the 
Cold War.”10  Southeast Asia became the front line of worldwide ideological struggle.  In 
9 Karnow, Vietnam: A History 9 
10 Schulzinger, A Time for War 329 
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this view it was America’s noble duty to halt the advance of the menacing monolith of 
Communism.  President Lyndon Johnson situated the war in such terms in this address to 
the American public: 
In the forties and fifties, we took our stand in Europe to protect the freedom of
those threatened by aggression. Now the center of attention has shifted to another 
part of the world where aggression is on the march and the enslavement of free 
men is the goal…  That is why it is vitally important to every American family 
that we stop the Communists in South Vietnam.11 
For Johnson, and policy makers from the White House to the Pentagon, Communism was 
America’s greatest threat. And it was on the rise.  In only half a century, Communist 
governments had gained control of Russia, Eastern Europe, China, North Korea, Cuba, 
and now they were threatening Vietnam.  Johnson felt that a line must be drawn to stop 
Communism, or it would continue to proliferate across the globe.  “The American 
crusade,” Historian Stanley Karnow writes, “propelled as it was by the ‘domino theory,’ 
and the naïve assumption that the entire region would collapse to the Communists if they 
won in Vietnam, disregarded the complex nationalistic diversity of Southeast Asia.”12 
The American government looked at the nationalists from North Vietnam and saw 
operatives from Moscow.  The United States sent its own troops to do what French troops 
before them could not – prop up the South Vietnamese government.  In intervening the 
United States staked its credibility on winning a war that it did not understand, and put its 
soldiers into a crucible of Vietnamese nationalism and internal politics that had been 
heating up for hundreds of years.  For the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong,
this conflict had nothing to do with the Cold War, it was simply another chapter in a 
11 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 27 
12 Karnow, Vietnam: A History 43 
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centuries long struggle for Vietnamese self-determination.  Vietnam Historian Stanley 
Karnow writes: 
The essential reality of the struggle was the Communists, imbued with an almost 
fanatical sense of dedication to a reunified Vietnam under their control, saw the 
war against the United States and its South Vietnamese ally as the continuation of 
two thousand years of resistance to Chinese and later French rule.  They were 
prepared to accept limitless casualties to attain their sacred objective.13 
While the United States may have drastically mistaken both the motives and the 
resolve of the Vietnamese, at least policy makers recognized that the conflict would not 
be a simple one. Robert Schulzinger writes:  
Even as they climbed the ladder of escalation, Americans knew that they would 
not easily prevail. President Johnson was often more aware of the dangers than 
many of his more hawkish advisers.  He knew the governments of South Vietnam
were weak, and he recognized the fragility of domestic support for the war effort.  
But he could not bring himself to turn back; the Cold War and American 
credibility seemed to matter too much.”14 
The momentum of the ideological struggle, coupled with a righteous sense of 
American exceptionalism, proved enough to propel the nation into war, even the wrong 
war. 
Vietnam was also a war of disillusionment.  In the 1960s, America was still living 
out John Winthrop’s 1630 proclamation that the nation was to be a shining city upon a 
hill. The nation had brought democracy to the contemporary world.  It had never lost a 
war, and after World War Two it had taken its rightful place as the economic and 
political engine of the free world. “I think there is a good deal of evidence that we 
13 Karnow, Vietnam: A History 17 
14 Schulzinger, A Time for War 330 
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thought all along that we were a redeemer nation.  There was a lot of illusion in our 
national history,” Prominent theologian Reinhold Neibur wrote of the war, “Now it is 
about to be shattered.”15  The war in Vietnam helped to expose the hidden cracks in 
American society. Divisions between rich and poor, as well as whites and minorities, 
were illuminated by the blaze of Vietnam.  The country lost its sense of self-assurance, 
and it came to blame the Vietnam War for this.  Samuel Hynes writes, it was “a war of 
national disillusionment that changed the way a generation thought about its country, its 
leaders, and war itself.”16 
Vietnam historian Robert Schulzinger claims that the war has a still greater 
significance, as a catalyst for the political and social upheaval of the 1960s.  He says, “the 
Vietnam War stands as the sort of watershed event for American politics, foreign policy, 
culture, values, and economy in the 1960s that the Civil War was in the 1860s and the 
Great Depression was in the 1930s.”17  The significance of Vietnam in American 
domestic politics and society has been long reaching.  Many of the fissures it created in 
American self-identity are still uncomfortable and unresolved. 
The My Lai Massacre plays a role in both the wrong war and the war of 
disillusionment. When Americans found out about it in 1969, they became aware of how 
little they knew about the war in Vietnam.  My Lai came as one of the nation’s first 
shocks about the nature of that war. Historian Michael Bilton claims that the massacre 
15 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 3 
16 Hynes, The Soldier’s Tale 179 
17 Schulzinger, A Time for War ix
7 

  
 
 
 
                                                 
clearly shifted American opinions towards the war. In an interview he said “[My Lai] 
was too big a price to pay, that if you were going to have to win this war by this kind of 
conduct, then it wasn’t a price worth paying.”18  In short, fighting the Vietnam War 
meant atrocity and massacre, this might be a war the public did not want to fight.  My Lai 
was also a strong factor in national disillusionment.  Many Americans reacted to the 
massacre with disbelief.  Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater claimed in a radio 
interview that he did not believe American soldiers were capable of committing such an 
atrocity.19  The same U.S. military that had stormed the beaches at Normandy was now 
implicated in the mass slaughter of unarmed civilians.  The nation itself was implicated in 
the crime. 
The ultimate result of the Vietnam War was devastating for both Vietnam and the 
United States. Schulzinger writes that for Vietnam, “the cost included three million dead, 
as many as fifteen million made refugees at different times throughout the war, and 
horrible physical devastation….”20 The country of Vietnam would take years to recover, 
plagued by hunger and turmoil for decades after unification.  The United States, on the 
other hand, suffered the loss of 58,000 young men and still carries the ghosts of the 
polarizing and devastating conflict. Karnow writes that the United States, one of the 
world’s superpowers “which had brought to bear stupendous military power to crack
Communist morale, itself shattered under the strain of a struggle that seemed to be 
18 American Experience, My Lai
19 Maxwell, interview
20 Schulzinger, A Time for War 335 
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interminable.”21  Samuel Hynes suggests that the unresolved memory of Vietnam offers, 
at best, guidance for the future. It reminds us of our own fallibility, the limits of our 
strength, and the waste of war. He writes: 
The story of the Vietnam War is a cautionary tale for our time, the war story that 
can teach us most….  For the people of the United State, the Vietnam War is more 
than a lesson in political unwisdom. It lingers in American minds like the 
memory of an illness, a kind of fever that weakened the country until its people 
were divided and its cause was lost.22 
21 Karnow, Vietnam: A History 20 
22 Hynes, The Soldiers’ Tale 177 
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Chapter Two 

The Great Society 

The decision to kill was not Larry’s.  Nor Lieutenant Calley’s.  Nor his superior officer, Captain Medina’s.  
Nor Lieutenant Colonel Barker’s.  It was America’s decision.  For whatever reason, America decided that 
there would be killing, and insofar as these men killed, they were all doing America’s bidding.23 – Scott 
Peck 
In analyzing how the My Lai Massacre the first factor that must be accounted for 
is the men.  Were they fundamentally brutal or evil?  Were they somehow different from
the rest of the other 2,600,000 American troops that served in Vietnam over the course of 
the war?24  This chapter explores where the men of Charlie Company had they come 
from, and how they found themselves in Vietnam.
The answer seems to be that Charlie Company was not substantially different than 
any other group of American soldiers.  On the contrary, the may as well have been the 
archetypical American rifle company.  The Defense Department’s own investigation of
the massacre, the Peers Commission, concluded “‘the men were generally representative 
of the typical cross section of American youth assigned to most combat units throughout 
the Army.’”25 
They were lead to Vietnam in March of 1968 by the same forces that lead the bulk of the 
United States Army there.  The demographics of combat units in the U.S. military in 
Vietnam bore less resemblance to a cross section of American society than it had in any 
previous war.  Samuel Hynes writes: 
23 Peck, People of the Lie 231 
24 Greiner, War Without Fronts 113 
25 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 51 
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For the Vietnam War, the United States chose not to send the middle-class young 
men who had written the war narratives of the two world wars, but sent instead 
young men from the lower end of the social ladder – the rural and urban poor, the 
unemployed and unemployable, with heavy concentrations from the areas where 
jobs were scarce: the cities and the South.26 
On paper, military recruitment distributions appeared to be equitable, with 
representation of minorities and classes roughly proportional to American society.  
However, in reality a well-honed system of deferments, exemptions, and volunteer 
specializations kept much of the nation’s upper economic strata well away from the 
fighting. According to historian Bernd Greiner, “Depending on whether one looks at the 
whole duration of the war or one single year, the proportion of those exempted from
military service varies between thirty-five and sixty-five percent.”27  For example, one 
widely-used deferment was for higher education.  By nature, this deferment favored the 
better-educated and wealthier sons of American families, who were scholastically and 
financially prepared to attend college. 
These exemptions were often secured for the sons of upper and middle class 
households, while the Army was filled out by men from lower and working class 
families.  Three quarters of the Army were drawn from the working and lower classes, 
while only a quarter from middle and upper class families with incomes higher than the 
national average.28  This dynamic was the subject of 1969 Creedence Clearwater Revival 
hit, Fortunate Son, which reflects the feeling that the wealthy and privileged were safe 
from the war.   
26 Hynes, The Soldiers’ Tale 183 
27 Greiner, War Without Fronts 113 
28 Greiner, War Without Fronts 114 
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And when the band plays hail to the chief, 

they point the cannon at you. 

It ain’t me, it ain’t me, I ain’t no senator’s son. 

It ain’t me, it ain’t me; I ain’t no fortunate one. 

Some folks inherit star spangled eyes,  

They send you down to war, 

And when you ask them, how much should we give?

they only answer more, more, more!29
 
These excerpts of the lyrics indicate a feeling that the war was chosen by the privileged 
class, who kept their own sons safe while sending young men they saw as expendable to 
war. As Bernd Greiner wrote, policy makers “sent into the field the youngest sons of
those who did not live in leafy suburbs, men who played an increasingly marginal role in 
the calculations of their electoral strategists.”30 America’s poor were most exposed to the 
draft because they had the least access to exemptions.  In the 1960s the burden of 
poverty, and therefore of the draft as well, fell especially heavily on minorities.
It is important to note, however, that 65% of the American soldiers that served in 
Vietnam were volunteers, including most of the men of Charlie Company.31  This does 
not necessarily mean that the men felt like they had a choice about being at war.  
Enlisting voluntarily had certain advantages over waiting to be drafted.  While voluntary 
enlistment meant signing on for three years of service rather than being pressed into two, 
it offered recruits the opportunity to choose where the Army placed them.  Specialization 
was a last resort for many men, including my dad, who accepted that they could not avoid 
serving in the armed forces, but still hoped to avoid duty as grunts.  After receiving his 
29 Creedence Cleawater Revival, Fortunate Son
30 Greiner, War Without Fronts 115 
31 Greiner, War Without Fronts 114 
12 

  
  
 
                                                 
draft notice, my dad volunteered, accepting an extra year in the Army in exchange for the 
chance to qualify for a specialization as an Army journalist.   
Educated young men often were in better positions to take advantage of these 
deals, just as with they were with the draft.  Conversely, youth from poor families may 
not have known these exemptions existed in the first place.  Because of this, class 
divisions existed well past recruitment, into the physical makeup of the Army.  While 
minorities and whites made up about the same proportions of the whole Army as they did 
in the demographics of the general population, minorities made up half of the average 
infantry company.32 So, while different racial groups were sending roughly proportional 
numbers of their youth to war, a much higher percentage of black and latino families had 
their sons maimed and killed. Charlie Company is a characteristic example of the makeup 
of infantry companies in Vietnam. For instance, while blacks made up roughly ten 
percent of the American population, they accounted for nearly half the members of 
Charlie Company.33 
It was the least fortunate sons of American society that made up infantry outfits in 
Vietnam, and they knew it.  The Army was made up of men whom society had given 
least to, and who were now sent to fight for a country that they felt would not fight for 
them.  Many such soldiers were full of resentment for the war before they even saw 
Vietnam.  It is a sad irony that while President Johnson’s social programs made efforts to 
ameliorate domestic divisions based upon class and race, his war and military only served 
to deepen them.  
32 Greiner, War Without Fronts 115 
33 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 51 
13 

  
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
Another demographic anomaly of the Vietnam War was the uniquely young 
average age of the soldiers that fought in it.  Historian Stanley Karnow writes:
The average age of the American soldier in Vietnam was nineteen, seven years 
younger than his father had been in World War II, which made him more
vulnerable to the psychological strains of the struggle – strains that were 
aggravated by the special tension of Vietnam, where every peasant might be a 
Vietcong terrorist.34 
The high concentration of youths was not limited to the rank and file of enlisted men.  
Many non-commissioned officers, as well as commissioned officers were little older or 
more mature than the men they commanded.35 
The youth of the American fighting forces was a reflection of another choice 
made by the country’s policy makers.  Rather than creating an Army of citizen soldiers, 
the Department of Defense created an army of teenagers.  These soldiers had the least to 
leave behind in the states, but they were also immature, and unanchored to the stabilizing 
influences of families and careers.  Nineteen-year-olds were sent for convenience, 
because they make compliant soldiers.  As Gwynne Dyer’s writes in War, “you can train 
older men to be soldiers… but you can never get them to believe that they like it, which 
is the major reason armies try to get their recruits before they are twenty.”36 
Sending teenagers to Vietnam was also politically expedient; it avoided sending 
fathers and businessmen into war.  However, it had consequences in the conduct of the 
war, which would be fought by young soldiers, experiencing combat “during one of the 
34 Karnow, Vietnam: a History 26 
35 Grossman, On Killing 265 
36 Grossman, On Killing 264 
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most malleable and vulnerable stages of their lives.”37  Samuel Hynes writes that the 
Vietnam Army was “an army of eighteen-year-olds, away from home for the first time, 
with only a few months of training to turn them from boys into soldiers, unused to taking 
responsibility or making moral decisions, dropped into an alien and fearful place.”-“It 
would be an army of uncertain, frightened boys.”38  Grossman suggests, “the combatants 
were without the leavening of mature, older soldiers that has always been there in past 
wars.”39  Essentially, the United States was sending teenagers into combat zones without 
adult supervision. These young men were on their own in the jungle, isolated from
everything they had ever known, harassed by a phantom enemy, with only time and 
firepower to spare. 
Again, Charlie Company was a characteristic example of the dynamic, with most 
of its men between 18 and 22 years old.  Lt. William Calley was 24 years old at the time
of the My Lai Massacre. Captain Ernest Medina was 31.40  In fact, Charlie Company was 
typical of the American troops in Vietnam in almost every way.  They were average 
nineteen-year-old American boys.  If there is nothing unusual about the men of Charlie 
Company that could have led them to mass murder, the causes of the massacre must be 
found elsewhere.
37 Grossman, On Killing 264 
38 Hynes, The Soldier’s Tale 184 
39 Grossman, On Killing 265 
40 Bilton, Four Hours In My Lai 48, 52 
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Chapter Three 

Military Strategy 

General Westmoreland’s strategy of attrition also had an important effect on our behavior.  Our mission 
was not to win terrain or seize positions, but simply to kill: to kill Communists and to kill as many of them 
as possible.  Stack ‘em like cordwood.  Victory was a high body-count, defeat a low kill-ratio, war a matter 
of arithmetic…. It is not surprising, therefore, that some men acquired a contempt for human life and a 
predilection for taking it.41 – Phillip Caputo
The Vietnam War was fought by both sides as a war of attrition, each seeking to 
destroy the other’s will and ability to fight. For the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, 
victory was a matter of waiting out the American occupation. “We don’t need to win 
military victories,” said a colonel in the North Vietnamese Army, “we only need to hit 
them until they give up and get out”.42  For the United States, the objective was to 
annihilate so many enemy guerrillas that the Viet Cong could no longer field an army. 
General Westmoreland, the commander of American forces in Vietnam, once summed up 
the American war strategy in this way: “We’ll just go on bleeding them until Hanoi 
wakes up to the fact that they have bled their country to the point of national disaster for 
generations.”43  The consequences of this particularly brutal kind of warfare were 
devastating to the country of Vietnam and its people, as well as to the soldiers that fought 
in the war. 
Attrition warfare is ugly, costly, and slow. It was not the American strategy 
because it was the best choice, but because it was the only choice.  Other means of 
41 Caputo, A Rumor of War xvii
42 Greiner, War Without Fronts 31 
43 Greiner, War Without Fronts 56 
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victory were implausible.  The United States could not march on Hanoi because crossing 
the Demilitarized Zone in Vietnam would bring the massive Chinese Army into the war 
on the side of North Vietnam.  American commanders feared the Chinese would force a 
stalemate in Vietnam as they had done in Korea a decade before.44  So the United States 
would fight a war against the Viet Cong guerrillas of South Vietnam as well as the North 
Vietnamese Army, but it would do so only in Southern Vietnam.
Furthermore, a war of attrition was a war the United States believed it could win.  
The United States had at its disposal the means to explode, incinerate, and defoliate 
enormous stretches of countryside; and could employ naval ships, B-52s, and heavy 
artillery to do so. Surely, military planners thought, such a well-funded and equipped 
fighting force could not lose a war of attrition to peasants in pajamas.   
By the late 1960s, the United States had brought the full weight of its military and 
industrial might to bear in Southeast Asia. Evidence that the war effort spared no 
expense can be found in the forty-two ice cream plants the government built in Vietnam 
to supply the troops with comfort food.45  More telling though, is the unprecedented 
amount of high explosives the United States expended in the war.  Between 1966 and 
1968 alone, the United States dropped 2,865,808 tons of bombs on Vietnam, nearly a 
third more munitions than it had spent in all theatres of World War Two combined.46 
Over the course of the Vietnam War, the United States fired seven million tons of 
44 Greiner, War Without Fronts 56 
45 Hynes, The Soldiers’ Tale 184 
46 Greiner, War Without Fronts 28 
17 

  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
artillery in North and South Vietnam.47  What this amounted to was twenty-six million 
bomb craters in a country of less than 130,000 square miles.3 In 1967, Life magazine 
reported that the cost of killing a single Viet Cong guerilla was $400,000, which included 
75 bombs and 150 artillery shells.48 Another study concluded that the United States 
expended 50,000 rounds of ammunition enemy killed.49 The United States was willing to 
pay an exorbitant price to pummel Vietnam into submission.  All told, the United States 
spent a staggering $120 billion to fight the Vietnam War.50 
The nature of the war of attrition meant that killing Viet Cong and North 
Vietnamese soldiers was the chief goal of American military planners.  This was a war 
unlike the ones they had fought throughout history.  South Vietnam was already occupied 
by American forces and administered by a friendly government.  There was no invasion, 
no advancing fronts. Fighting the insurgency was a matter or rooting them out in areas 
that were already ostensibly under American control.  Therefore the United States was 
forced to measure its success in the war by how many enemies it had killed.  Without the 
benefit of “dramatic and easily comprehended standards of success, it was not surprising 
that the body count should grab the attention of policy makers, media, and public 
alike”.51 
This measure of success gave the Vietnam War a particularly grizzly demeanor.  
In traditional wars, the primary objectives had been rivers, bridges, and cities.  The 
47 Greiner, War Without Fronts 29 
48 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 33 
49 Grossman, On Killing 254 
50 Karnow, Vietnam: A History 24 
51 Gartner, Body Counts and “Success” in the Vietnam and Korean Wars 379 
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killing of enemy soldiers was a secondary task - a means to the greater end of securing 
the next objective. In past wars, armies could fight entire wars without so frankly 
recognizing that their true purpose was to kill.  However, in Vietnam, the goal was 
painfully simple: to kill as many Viet Cong as possible.  This was a new kind of driving 
force, and it gave Vietnam a new kind of character. 
Greiner explains: 
Above all, many commanding officers were personally committed to a strategy of 
aggressive war unfettered by scruples. Because their success was measured in a 
‘body count’ balance sheet and future promotion depended on a positive 
assessment in Vietnam, in the end it did not matter by what ways and means the 
desired ‘kill ratios’ were reached.52 
Small American units, operating autonomously in large stretches of Vietnamese 
countryside had a directive to kill as many Viet Cong as possible, and an incentive to 
define “Viet Cong” as broadly as possible. This helped to give birth to the rule of thumb 
that Lieutenant Caputo learned in the bush after trying to disambiguate official 
distinctions between combatants and civilians: “the skipper finally said, ‘Look, I don’t 
know what this is supposed to mean, but I talked to battalion and they said that as far as 
they’re concerned, if he’s dead and Vietnamese, he’s VC.”53 
Greiner writes, “McNamara’s insistence on the body count, together with the 
concept of a mathematically calculable breaking-point of the enemy, presented the usual 
delusion of feasibility in the unusual form of business management statistics.”54  He 
explains, “an area was occupied, cleared out, occupied once more and again cleared out 
52 Greiner, War Without Fronts 20 
53 Caputo, A Rumor of War 74 
54 Greiner, War Without Fronts 64 
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by one’s own troops, over and over again and always in the hope that the enemy would 
follow up with fresh troops which would fall under massive fire from American units.”55 
The vacuum trap was the new war of attrition. Always aware that they were 
fighting communists, the U.S. Military loved to quote Mao Zedong, “especially the 
saying that ‘the guerillas are the fish and the people are the sea.’  But the solution to that 
problem was draining the sea.”56  The United States drained the sea by clearing vast areas 
of the Vietnamese countryside of their civilian inhabitants, and then declaring the areas 
free fire zones, allowing the United States to carry out unrestrained warfare on the only 
people left, presumably the Viet Cong.  Free fire zones were relentlessly pounded by 
explosives and herbicides as the Army sought to destroy crops and villages that might 
help the Viet Cong. Greiner reports that while the vacuum trap policy was never 
officially declared, the United States pursued it with “rigorous determination.”57 
The first step in creating free fire zones was clearing them of civilians, or at least 
making a show of doing so.  The United States and the South Vietnamese government 
tried to resettle the peasants first by means of leaflets that asked them to leave their 
homes.  Typical of the leaflets dropped in free fire zones is this example: “Dear Citizens: 
… The U.S. Marines will not hesitate to destroy immediately, any village or hamlet 
harboring the Vietcong… The choice is yours.”58 The United States employed the use of 
55 Greiner, War Without Fronts 56 
56 American Experience, My Lai
57 Greiner, War Without Fronts 74 
58 Greiner, War Without Fronts 75 
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leaflets almost as prolifically as it did bombs.  50 billion leaflets were dropped on 
Vietnam;1,500 for every person in the country.59 
Yet in spite of their enormous numbers, the leaflets dropped to the Vietnamese 
peasants likely had very little effect.  Most of the Vietnamese peasants were illiterate and 
unable to read the warnings; dropped down to them from thousands of feet by a foreign 
power. Even if they had they been able to decipher these alien messages, they might 
have been unlikely to take advice from a country that had already indiscriminately 
bombed and strafed them.  Finally, in spite of the perceived impermanence and 
expandability of the villages on the part of the Americans, to the Vietnamese they were 
far more than thatched huts and mud.  Greiner writes, “in the eyes of their inhabitants, 
villages were much more than places to live or cultivate; they were revered as shrines, the 
natural world around them was the home of the spirits they prayed to and the graves of
their ancestors were symbols of death and reincarnation.  Leaving these places was 
unthinkable.”60 
If the leaflets were ineffectual, there were other means of resettling the peasantry.  
Most of the civilians in Vietnam that resettled did so because they had no choice.  The 
United States and South Vietnamese governments forcibly resettled four million 
Vietnamese peasants into government created fortified villages called ‘agrovilles’.61  In 
spite of the public declarations of the United States that it was in Vietnam to protect the 
civilians, it quietly held the 3,000 refugee camps filled with dispossessed peasants as a 
59 Greiner, War Without Fronts 60 
60 Greiner, War Without Fronts 73 
61 Greiner, War Without Fronts 74 
21 

  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
mark of success in draining the sea.  Greiner writes, “high numbers of refugees were 
interpreted as a successful weakening of the Viet Cong.”62 
Although there were millions of refugees of the Vietnam War, those civilians who 
were able to, chose to stay in their villages.  In the last twenty-five years these peasants 
had seen occupation by the French, the Japanese, the French again, and now the 
Americans. Their indifference towards the American presence was a callous that had 
been painfully earned by decades of continuous warfare.  In spite of the fact that many 
Vietnamese remained inside the areas that had been declared free fire zones, the United 
States still chose to treat these areas as exactly that.  
 Greiner explains: 
For the Americans, the whole point of clearing an area of countryside of its 
people was so that anyone who remained must be Viet Cong.  These areas became 
free-fire zones. Anything that happened to someone in a free-fire zone was their 
own fault; they could expect the worst. The belief that the people had been given 
a chance to get out and had made their choice made the strategy more morally 
workable. In a free-fire zone, the pursuit of a high body count could proceed 
unencumbered by the need to discriminate between combatants and civilians at 
all.63 
Although the leaflets were demonstrably ineffectual on the peasants they were 
dropped on, the thousands of leaflets blowing around must have been a ubiquitous site for 
another group of people in Vietnam: the American soldiers.  The leaflets gave the GIs 
operating in free fire zones reassurance that everyone had fair warning to get out.  If a GI 
in a free fire zone made a kill that was questionable, they knew that the dead had been 
warned that civilians were told to leave. This view is iterated by a soldier from the 25th 
62 Greiner, War Without Fronts 75 
63 Greiner, War Without Fronts 60 
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Division, who said, “If these people want to stay there and support the Communists, then 
they can expect to be bombed.”64  From there, it was only a short jump to thinking of 
everyone in the free fire zones as the enemy, as this GI put it in 1967:  
They’re all VC or at least helping them – same difference.  You can’t convert 
them, only kill them.  Don’t lose any sleep over those dead children – they grow 
up to be commies too.  This is a war and we have to stop the commies any way 
we can, using whatever we’ve got.65 
My Lai was located in one such free fire zone that by 1968 had already been 
devastated by American firepower.  The institutional mentality of indifference towards 
civilian life that the “vacuum trap” policy was based on can be seen in statements made 
by members of Charlie Company after the massacre.  Kenneth Hodges, a squad leader, 
stated “the order was to kill or destroy everything in the village, the children happened to 
be there. The people of that village were Vietcong or Vietcong sympathizers.  Maybe 
some see it differently.  That’s the way I see it.”66 
The American war effort, largely unbridled by expense or collateral damage, 
proved to be very effective at accomplishing its purpose of killing enemy soldiers.  Bernd 
Greiner notes, “At the climax of the war at the end of 1967 the Communist side relied on 
a force of about 200,000 combat troops….  In the period from 1964 to 1975, however, 
about 444,000 soldiers of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army lost their lives 
on the battlefield. In other words, the Communist side lost a complete army twice 
over.”67  However, the American way of war came at very dear price to the Vietnamese 
64 Greiner, War Without Fronts 72 
65 Greiner, War Without Fronts 84 
66 American Experience, My Lai
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civilians, of which two million were killed over the course of the war.68  Even these high 
levels of both military and civilian casualties were not enough to break the will of the 
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. 
The leaders on the communist sides had already fought occupation by the 
Japanese and the French, and were well prepared for the challenges of asymmetrical 
warfare. They knew that American soldiers would not parse bullets discriminating 
between combatants and civilians, and it is likely the Viet Cong hoped they would not. 
Greiner writes, “the guerrillas happily accepted that [the Americans] would not make this 
distinction, thereby deliberately and even intentionally risking the lives of non­
participants.” As evidence of this Greiner cites “’a Vietnamese political functionary in a 
US Army study:  ‘The Party has been guided by the principle that it is better to kill ten 
innocent people than to let one enemy escape’”.69  The Vietnamese may have pushed this 
part of their strategy into horrific extremes.  One account by a former Viet Cong agent 
claims, “Children were trained to throw grenades.  Not only for the terror factor, but so 
the government or American soldiers would have to shoot them.  Then the Americans 
feel very ashamed.  And they blame themselves and call their soldiers war criminals”.70 
The historical record is unclear to what extent the Viet Cong deliberately placed 
civilians in the line of fire, and to what extent they regretted these losses, but it is clear 
that they were a part of the Viet Cong strategy of asymmetrical war.  Greiner writes, “the 
price the civilians paid was of no account; the importance was the price to be extorted 
68 Tucker, Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War
69 Greiner, War Without Fronts 38 
70 Grossman, On Killing 267 
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from the enemy: the fact that he was gradually renouncing his claim to represent a 
morally superior cause, was exposed in the eyes of the people had come to Vietnam to 
protect, and not least discredited in world opinion.”71  Put more explicitly, the Viet Cong 
knew the American excursion in Vietnam was rooted in an American belief that it was 
fighting for a good cause. Standing in the way of Communism’s progress was regarded 
as the noble burden borne by the protector of the free world.  The Viet Cong sought to 
turn the war from a “good war” to a “dirty war”, frustrating the morals and high purpose 
that brought America to Southeast Asia.  The Viet Cong made the American belief in its 
own “moral high ground” a primary target.  Former Vietnamese Colonel Bui Tin 
explained: 
The American rear was vulnerable.  Every day our leadership would listen to 
world news over the radio at 9 a.m. to follow the growth of the American anti-war 
movement…The conscience of America was part of its war-making capability, 
and we were turning that power in our favor.  America lost because of its 
democracy; through dissent and protest it lost the ability to mobilize a will to 
win”.72 
For the Americans, the peasants were an obstruction and inconvenience at best, 
and suspicious and threatening at worst. Collateral damage to civilian populations was 
viewed as a negative but necessary consequence of asymmetrical war.  For the Viet 
Cong, the peasants were human shields, bait, and a necessary sacrifice. More than 
anyone, the peasants lost the war.  Unwillingly, they had become the great battlefield of 
Vietnam.
71 Greiner, War Without Fronts 38 
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The GIs of Charlie Company, like all American soldiers in Vietnam, had been 
warned against unnecessary violence towards civilians.  They had been lectured on the 
rules of engagement.  American leadership stressed the importance of gentility towards 
the peasants. To this end, the Army took cursory efforts to train their teenage infantry 
against using their M-16s and explosives irresponsibly.  To be carried along with their 
equipment, soldiers were issued two cards outlining the soldier’s responsibility towards 
civilians. Inscribed on the cards were trite guidelines typified by the following:
“Treat the sick and wounded captive as best you can… he is a human being and 
must be treated like one,” and “The soldier shows his strength by his fairness, firmness 
and humanity to the persons in his hands”.73  Bilton reports that by the time of the My Lai 
Massacre the Army had issued “scores of directives issued by the military command in 
which avoidance of civilian casualties at all costs is emphasized in the strongest terms.”74 
However, while the soldiers were operating under the guidance of all of those 
directives affirming the value of Vietnamese life, they had another kind of directive to 
learn from as well: experience.  GIs in Charlie Company and across Vietnam saw first­
hand, in the field, how the American military planners really felt about the peasants in the 
countryside. They were expendable. The GIs knew that commanders felt no qualms 
about killing civilians. 
This was illustrated to the GIs as they saw explosives from their warplanes and 
artillery destroy villages frequently, and with little provocation. Bilton claims, “from the 
beginning of American involvement, it had become common practice for patrols to call 
73 Bilton, Four Hours In My Lai 37 
74 Bilton, Four Hours In My Lai 37 
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for artillery or an air strike if they received even sniper fire from a village – irrespective 
of whether civilians also sheltered there. By the end of 1966, fighter bombers were 
making up to four hundred such sorties a day.”75  The evidence shows that this policy 
was followed fairly consistently. Bilton reports that by1967, American fighter-bombers 
were making up to four hundred such strikes on villages every day.76  An Air Force 
Captain explained the simplicity of decision making in such cases: “the villages were 
very small, like a mound in a swamp. There were no names for some of them…the U.S. 
Air Force had spotters looking for muzzle flashes, and if that flash came from that dot, 
they’d wipe out the village.  It was that simple.”77 
As the American war effort expanded, so did civilian casualties. Bilton writes, 
“civilian casualties among the people of the South whom the Americans had come to 
Vietnam to protect rose form an estimated 100,000 a year in 1965 to 300,000 a year in 
1968.”78 Smoldering villages became part of the landscape of the Vietnam War seen by 
GIs on the walking tour.  Samuel Hynes writes, “civilians were killed distantly by bombs 
and napalm and artillery shells, and at closer range in infantry attacks on their villages; 
and the troops as they advanced saw the people they had killed, including the women and 
children and the old.”79 
The soldiers of Charlie Company operated in a province that had been particularly 
devastated by American bombing.  In fact, by Charlie Company’s arrival in Quang Ngai 
75 Bilton, Four Hours In My Lai 33 
76 Bilton, Four Hours In My Lai 33 
77 Greiner, War Without Fronts 69 
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Province, seventy percent of its villages had already been destroyed.80  With seven out of 
ten villages already in ashes, the men would have felt a strong sense of the expendability 
of Vietnamese lives, homes, and entire villages. 
The GIs may not have questioned the difference between killing civilians with 
bombs and with guns, but the conclusion that Vietnamese life had little value would 
certainly have been abundantly clear. Charlie Company was only in Vietnam for three 
months before they committed the massacre at My Lai.  Likely it did not take even that 
long for most American GIs to learn the critical lesson that “the only good gook is a dead 
gook,” something my dad found out after his first week in country. 
My dad, a veteran of the same division as Charlie Company, confirms that 
brutality towards civilians was not simply a byproduct of the war, it was an institutional 
mentality.  Upon arriving in Vietnam in July of 1968, Dad was sent to the Americal 
Division’s headquarters for a week of in-country training at its replacement depot in Chu 
Lai, the “Combat Center”.
Dad says the infantryman’s single most important directive was made very clear 
in the Combat Center: “You will maintain the kill ratio,” the GIs were repeatedly told.81 
Furthermore, “In the Combat Center they taught us how to violate the Geneva 
Conventions, and any other human decency,” he remembers.  “They taught us how to 
cover up the execution of prisoners, and interrogation by helicopter” he said.  The latter 
procedure meant take three or four prisoners up in a helicopter and asking questions.  “If 
80 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 14, 44
81 Maxwell, interview 
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the first one doesn’t answer,” my dad was told,  “throw him out.  If the second one 
doesn’t answer, throw him out too.  By the time you get to the last one, he’ll tell you what 
you want to know,” the instructor said.”82 
“The only good gook is a dead gook,” was an often-repeated phrase that seemed 
to sum up the Army’s take on the war.  While not every member of Charlie Company 
would have passed through the Americal’s combat center at headquarters, the 
institutionalized brutality that was taught there suggests that, as my dad put it, “the My 
Lai mentality came straight from the top.”  My dad passed through the Combat Center in 
July of 1968, only six months after the My Lai Massacre, so his account should provide a 
reasonably accurate picture or how the Americal Division functioned during the 
timeframe in question.  Furthermore, because the Army’s own investigation of the 
massacre would eventually charge both the commander and assistant commander of the 
Americal Division for negligence and dereliction of duty in failing to investigate reports 
of the massacre, it is plausible to assume that division commanders were aware of the 
kind of conduct their soldiers were committing in the field, that they likely knew that 
some degree of massacre had taken place, and that in failing to investigate these war 
crimes, gave at least their implicit approval to continuing criminal conduct.83 
82 Maxwell, interview
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Chapter Four 

Individuals 

There is also the aspect of the Vietnam War that distinguished it from other American conflicts – its 
absolute savagery.  I mean the savagery that prompted so many American fighting men – the good, solid 
kids from Iowa farms – to kill civilians and prisoners.84 – Phillip Caputo
Charlie Company entered the Vietnam War in when America was still in period 
of heady optimism, in both the cause, and military superiority.  1967 was early in the 
large-scale stage of American intervention in Vietnam, and enthusiasm for the fight 
against communism was strong.  “The enemy’s hopes are bankrupt,” General 
Westmoreland had recently proclaimed, “We have reached the important point when the 
end begins to come into view.”85  This optimistic attitude was embodied by the men of 
Charlie Company.  Squad Leader John Smail remembers, “When I first went, I was into 
the idea that I was going to free these people and stop Communists from spreading.”86 
Fred Widmer, Charlie Company’s Radio Operator, felt compelled to go to war for 
similarly patriotic reasons: “Having grown up with parents that came from World War II 
and people that were in the Korean War… you felt it was basically your duty to go ahead 
and go to war.”87 
When the soldiers of Charlie Company arrived in Vietnam, the only thing 
differentiating them from any other rifle company in the division was an exemplary 
record in their training at Schofield Barracks in Hawaii.  Under the leadership of Captain 
84 Caputo, A Rumor of War xix 
85 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 45 
86 American Experience, My Lai
87 American Experience, My Lai
30 

  
  
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
Medina, the men had excelled in exercises in jungle warfare.  “We took every award,” 
Medina later remembered.88  Charlie Company had carried out one amphibious assault 
exercise so successfully that the regimental historian was brought in to make a record of 
it.89 
If Charlie Company had left Hawaii as the best in its battalion, carrying notions of 
valor and heroism, the jarring reality they found in Vietnam must have been 
disappointing and unsettling. In December 1967 Charlie Company was deployed near 
the city of Chu Lai, in the boondocks of the I Corps area of South Vietnam, directly south 
of the demilitarized zone.  I Corps was administrated and defended by the Marine Corps, 
with the exception of the American Division and Task Force Barker, to which Charlie 
Company belonged. 
The men arrived in Vietnam just in time to get a front row seat for the infamous 
Tet Offensive of February 1968.90  According to historian Michael Bilton, Charlie 
Company was stationed just outside Quang Ngai City during the offensive, a position 
from which it observed the strength of their enemy.  Bilton writes: 
through the night they could hear the din of the fighting in Quang Ngai, but more 
chilling and eerie were the tremendous sights from 60 miles away as munitions 
dumps were blown up at the gigantic American airfield at Chu Lai.”91 
The green company’s illusions of glory and victory must was sapped by the ominous 
sight of blazing fires at their own division headquarters.  Their disillusionment continued 
into the next day, as Charlie Company watched an entire battalion of Viet Cong forces 
88 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 52 
89 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 52 
90 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 70 
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withdraw from Quang Ngai City, having successfully overrunning a South Vietnamese 
training center.92 The company was helpless to do anything but watch the battalion march 
by in the distance, as the South Vietnamese government did not permit them to call in 
artillery. 
The Tet Offensive was Charlie Company’s initiation to the uncertainty and 
frustration of the Vietnam War.  The Viet Cong, an enemy that American military 
commanders had repeatedly claimed was at a breaking point, had executed well-
organized, simultaneous surprise attacks on numerous South Vietnamese and American 
positions throughout the country. Whether General Westmoreland recognized it or not, it 
became very clear to Charlie Company that the enemy was as strong as ever.  They began 
to feel that they were surrounded by the enemy, that the enemy was not afraid of them, 
and that the fight would not be quick or easy.  Charlie Company had arrived in Quang 
Ngai province believing that it was part of the winning team, but now they began to feel 
besieged. Lieutenant Calley recalled thinking, “you don’t have any place really to go 
home… think what he (the Viet Cong) would do to your company if he caught you 
alone.”93 
As the February of 1968 wore on, Charlie Company learned the hard reality of the 
Vietnam War.  Task Force Barker was given the job of hunting down the 48th Viet Cong 
Local Force Battalion, the outfit that had assaulted Quang Ngai during the Tet Offensive.  
Charlie Company, and the others in the task force, searched the province on foot patrol 
after foot patrol for an elusive enemy.  Bilton writes, “The traps always closed empty.  
92 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 69 
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They were chasing phantoms.  There was nothing to show for the long, hot, exhausting 
days tramping through paddy fields and friendless villages.”94  Phillip Caputo, a Marine 
Lieutenant that served in I Corps wrote of the frustration brought on by patrols:  
In the vacuum of that jungle, we could have gone in as many directions as there 
are points on a compass, and any one direction was as likely to lead us to the VC, 
or away from them, as any other.  The guerrillas were everywhere, which is 
another way of saying they where nowhere.95 
While Task Force Barker’s patrols searched for a large body of Viet Cong troops, they 
found the enemy only in booby traps and snipers.  Charlie Company began to suffer its 
first casualties in February. The company was being harassed, they were pawns in the 
game of the Viet Cong.  Squad leader Joe Grimes describes the effects the sporadic and 
random violence had on the company: 
February was our most devastating month for Charlie Company. It drove us to the 
ground. It’s just like if you had a wound, and they would stick something in that 
wound and go a little bit deeper. Every time somebody else got killed, and it was 
like that wound, and it would go a little deeper. And the hurt never stopped.96 
Attacks appeared from nowhere and disappeared just as suddenly.  Machine gunner Greg 
Olsen described the anxiety and fear this provoked: “When you're dealing with snipers, 
it's like a roulette wheel. You know, there's 30 or 40 of us out there walking around. 
Which one of us is going to get it? You know, you – it's a roll of the dice. And the same 
thing with the booby-traps.”97  The soldiers of Charlie Company were never at ease as 
they patrolled the jungles of Quang Ngai province.  Constant tension prevailed, and the 
men lived in fear of the very ground they walked on.  Phillip Caputo wrote:
94 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 70 
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This kind of warfare has its own peculiar terrors.  It turns an infantryman’s world 
upside down. The foot soldier has a special feeling for the ground. He walks on 
it, fights on it, sleeps and eats on it; the ground shelters him under fire; he digs his 
home in it.  But mines and booby traps transform that friendly, familiar earth into 
a thing of menace, a thing to be feared as much as machine guns or mortar shells.  
The infantryman knows that any moment the ground he is walking on can erupt 
and kill him; kill him if he’s lucky.  If he’s unlucky, he will be turned into a blind, 
deaf, emasculated, legless shell.  It was not warfare. It was murder.98 
Constant anxiety was fully realized as horror on the morning of February 25th, 
when Charlie Company walked into a minefield.  “We had walked into the middle of it 
before anyone had tripped anything.  Anybody who moved to try to help someone just 
got blown up themselves,” one soldier remembered.  The company suffered 15 casualties 
that morning, including three dead.99  The effect on the men was profound. Historian 
Martin Gershen suggests that this single event was so damaging to Charlie Company that 
it was a factor directly linked to the Massacre.  He writes: 
Charlie Company…died in an enemy minefield on the morning of February 25, 
1968. The haunted, hollow-eyed, shell-shocked survivors who stormed My Lai 4 
three weeks later were psychologically twisted, emotionally disturbed wrecks of 
the boys who had arrived in Vietnam three and a half months earlier.100 
Michael Bernhardt, a member of Charlie Company said, “When you have been through a 
minefield and put the remains of friends in body bags, nothing shocks you anymore.”101 
The men of Charlie Company had only been in Vietnam for two months, but they were 
fully acclimated to the brutality of the war.  The shattering of the illusion of their own 
strength came at a high cost to the moral compass of the group.  Psychiatrist Scott Peck 
describes how this kind of trauma can serve to diminish how life is valued:
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99 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 84 
100 Gershen, Destroy or Die 13 
101 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 85 
34 

  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Insensitive to our own suffering, we tend to become insensitive to the suffering of 
others. Treated with indignity, we lose not only the sense of our own dignity but 
also the sense of the dignity of others.  When it no longer bothers us to see 
mangled bodies, it will no longer bother us to mangle them ourselves.102 
Charlie Company had arrived in Vietnam believing it was a troupe of heroes and 
crusaders, but found that it was just an array of targets on a firing range. There was no 
dignity even in death. Dying in combat, the greatest patriotic self-sacrifice, was not a 
mano a mano struggle between warriors, but an ignoble, dizzying instant of randomness 
and shock. In a near constant state of fear and alert, Charlie Company desperately 
wanted to release the tension by confronting the enemy in a an open battle.  However, the 
Viet Cong refused to admit such open hostilities.  Radio Operator Fred Widmer describes 
the feeling, “You can’t fight.  There’s nothing to fight.  You can’t fight a booby trap. 
You can’t fight a sniper” (American Experience).  
The men of Charlie Company were continually harassed by the Viet Cong, and 
constantly in fear of mines and booby traps.  While they had lost fully a quarter of their 
strength to casualties, they had yet to inflict significant damage on their enemy.103  The 
pent up aggression felt by men in rifle companies is described by Phillip Caputo,
I burned with a hatred for the Viet Cong and with an emotion that dwells in most 
of us, one closer to the surface than we care to admit: a desire for retribution.  I 
did not hate the enemy for their politics, but for murdering Simpson, for executing 
that boy whose body had been found in the river, for blasting the life out of Walt 
Levy. Revenge was one of the reasons I volunteered for a line company.  I 
wanted a chance to kill somebody.104 
102 Peck, People of the Lie 221 
103 American Experience, My Lai
104 Caputo, A Rumor of War 221 
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While the Viet Cong continued to elude Charlie Company, the men began to 
direct their animosity and aggression at the Vietnamese they could see: the civilians. On 
the strategic level, American commanders saw the Viet Cong and the Vietnamese 
population as very distinct and separate groups.  One must be annihilated, the other 
protected. For the American soldiers walking through Quang Ngai province, the problem
was not so simple.  They saw the two groups as being more similar than different, and 
their hatred for and distrust for the other quickly bled together.  As psychiatrist Scott 
Peck wrote, “the Viet Cong, were largely indigenous to the South Vietnamese people, 
from whom they were often impossible to distinguish.  Almost inevitably the specified 
enemy was generalized to include all Vietnamese, so that the average American soldier 
did not just hate the Viet Cong, he hated “Gooks” in general.”105 Or, as the Army’s lead 
investigator of the My Lai Massacre would later more succinctly observe, many soldiers 
“viewed the Vietnamese with contempt, considering them subhuman, on the level of 
dogs.”106 
Many soldiers held the civilians responsible for the enemy mines, and when the 
enemy could not be found, they took revenge on civilians too.  Charlie Company Squad 
Leader Lawrence La Croix describes how easy it became to blame civilians for the deaths 
of comrades: “They know where the mines and booby traps are, they have to or they 
can’t work in the fields, they can’t move between villages, you know. But they’re not 
gonna tell you. They’re gonna let you blow your leg off.”107  Radio Operator Fred 
105 Peck, People of the Lie 225 
106 Peers, The My Lai Inquiry 230 
107 American Experience, My Lai 
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Widmer also remembers how GIs gradually began to conceptualize the enemy as not just 
the Viet Cong, but all Vietnamese: 
We had heard a lot about women and children being used as booby-traps and being 
members of the Viet Cong.  As time went on you tended to believe it more and 
more. There was no question that they were working for the Viet Cong….You 
didn’t trust them anymore.  You didn’t trust anybody….And I would say that in the 
end, anybody that was still in that country was the enemy.108 
So “gooks,” in general became an outlet for the anger that soldiers felt. The GIs 
may have felt powerless in their fight against the Viet Cong, but they had all the power 
they wanted over the civilians they encountered.  The GIs were young, and they were 
bigger, and stronger than the Vietnamese villagers.  They roved the countryside in gangs, 
and they had automatic weapons. Some GIs used their power for physical gratification.  
Greg Olsen, a Charlie Company Machine Gunner, said “I remember one guy that held a 
young girl at gunpoint and made her perform oral sex on him. And then, he cut off her 
ponytail and stuck it in his helmet.”109  Sexual assault and rape were commonplace in 
Vietnam, and why not?  Teenage boys chock-full of hormones, sharpened by fear and 
calloused by violence, lived in a world where their occupation was killing and every 
civilian was the enemy.   
Greg Olsen explains, “You stick some jerk over there and give him a gun and very 
little restriction and you stick him in a free-fire zone, he’s going to live out all these 
things he’d go to prison for in the states.110  If you could kill, why not rape? Sex, even 
forced sex, helped petrified and insecure soldiers reassert their masculinity.  One soldier 
108 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 74 
109 American Experience, My Lai
110 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 81 
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remembered the drive for sex this way:
It was to let you know you’re still a human being… Sex proves you’re not a 
fucking animal.  Picture this – you come in off an operation… some of your friends 
are dead… You know you stunk of fear – you had to get laid. The only release 
was fucking.111 
Sexual assaults sometimes included physical mutilations, and were often committed in 
public, compounding the violation of a single woman’s body with the humiliation and 
emotional torment of not only herself, but her family and community as well.  As such, 
rapes were not only acts of physical gratification for the soldiers that committed them,
but exertions of dominance and control over the enemy.  While sexual assaults were only 
committed, or even seen, by few soldiers their occurrence was known and accepted by 
infantrymen across Vietnam.  Charlie Company’s Varnado Simpson captured the casual 
ubiquity of these acts, commenting, “Rape? Oh, that happened every day.”112 
Men also sought gratification beating, torturing, and killing Vietnamese outside of 
combat. Michael Berndhardt, of Charlie Company, recalls how performing these acts on 
broader and broader categories of Vietnamese became acceptable: 
It started with just [killing] plain prisoners – prisoners you thought were the 
enemy.  Then you’d go on to prisoners who weren’t the enemy, and then the 
civilians because there was no difference between the enemy and civilians.  It 
came to the point where a guy could kill anybody.113 
Anger was often taken out on individuals, according to Phillip Caputo. He writes, “It was 
common knowledge that quite a few captured VC never made it to prison camps; they 
were reported as ‘shot and killed while attempting to escape.’  Some line companies did 
111 Greiner, War Without Fronts 161 
112 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 81 
113 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 78 
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not even bother taking prisoners; they simply killed every VC they saw, and a number of 
Vietnamese who were only suspects.”114 
This behavior seems to have been condoned by the leadership of rifle companies 
across the United States Army, and in Charlie Company especially.  Bilton reports, 
“[Captain] Medina’s dislike of the Vietnamese was clear for everyone to see. GIs who 
showed kindness to prisoners were rebuked.  According to witnesses, Medina himself 
beat up suspects during interrogation.”115  With at least the tacit approval of the officers, 
malicious behaviors which were, on paper, very illegal became commonplace. This letter 
from Greg Olsen, describes how such events would take place:  
One of our platoons went on a routine patrol today and came across a 155­
millimeter round that was booby- trapped. Killed one man, blew the legs off two 
others, and injured two more. On their way back to the LZ, they saw a woman 
working in the fields. They shot and wounded her. Then, they kicked her to death 
and emptied their magazines into her head. It was murder; I’m ashamed of myself 
for not trying to do something about it. This isn’t the first time, Dad.116
 Revenge could be exacted upon a single Vietnamese civilian, as it was in Olsen’s 
account, or it could be applied to larger groups - even entire villages.  Lieutenant Caputo, 
in his personal biography of his Vietnam War experience, relates ordering his men to set 
fire to the Vietnamese village Giao-Tri after his platoon was hit by a booby trap while 
passing through. 
Tit for tat. You let the VC use your village for an ambush site, I think, and now 
you’re paying the price.  It is then I realize that the destruction of Giao-Tri was 
more than an act of madness committed in the heat of battle.  It was an act of 
retribution as well. These villagers aided the VC, and we taught them a lesson.117 
114 Caputo, A Rumor of War 229 
115 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 79 
116 American Experience, My Lai
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Torture, rape, and murder were, in part, a factor of the asymmetrical war in which 
made civilians into combatants.  They were also actions in which GIs were able to assert 
brutal and unlimited power – the power to do anything they wanted – over other people, 
whom they imagined to be their enemies.  Carried out for revenge, for lust, and to assert 
dominance, these acts all were ways for the fearful soldiers to again feel empowered.  
They were committed with all the more fervor because of the uncertainty the soldiers felt 
in their own safety and position.  All of these acts were war crimes, but a tiny minority of 
them ever saw prosecution.  This was part of the nature of the war, and the way it was 
being fought. 
Charlie Company had slipped a long way since arriving in Vietnam in December 
1967. They had been sniped at, blown up by mines and booby traps, and constantly 
immiserated by fear of an invisible enemy.  Lack of large-scale contact with the Viet 
Cong left them frustrated, and led them to see the civilians and the enemy as essentially 
one and the same.  Some soldiers took this a step further, making individuals victims of 
fits of aggression, and outlets for their rage, anguish, and confusion.  It was not much 
further to fall down this slippery slope before an entire village might be destroyed to 
serve just this purpose. 
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Chapter Five 

The Massacre 

The order that was given was to kill everyone in the village.  Someone asked if that mean the women and 
children.  And the order was: kill everyone in the village.  Because the people that were in the village – the 
women, the kids, the old men – were VC…. – Sgt. Hodges, Charlie Company118 
On the evening of March 15th 1968, Captain Medina gathered the members of 
Charlie Company around him and briefed them on the next day’s mission, the one that 
would earn them their place in the history books.  Medina told the company that in My 
Lai 4 they’d be directly engaging the 48th Viet Cong Battalion, the same company they 
had watched retreat from Quang Ngai during the Tet Offensive.119  The enemy strength 
was estimated at 250 men, so Charlie Company was in for a good fight, Medina told 
them.120  Medina also told them that this was their chance to get even with the VC for the 
men Charlie Company had lost.  Radio Operator Fred Widmer recalls the anticipation the 
men felt on March 15th, “Your adrenalin started to flow just thinking about the next day. 
We were going to get into it – and this is what we’re here for. Finally, at last, it was 
gonna happen.”121  The men had every reason to believe they were heading into full-scale 
combat.  Medina would later testify that he had instructed his company in this way: “The 
village could be destroyed since it was a VC stronghold, to burn the houses down, to kill 
118 Bilton, Four Hours In My Lai 99 
119 Bilton, Four Hours In My Lai 98 
120 Bilton, Four Hours In My Lai 98 
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all the livestock, to cut any of the crops that might feed the VC, to cave the wells, and 
destroy the village.”122 
The historical record agrees that at this point one of the soldiers asked if the 
women and children were to be killed as well.  However, there has been considerable 
debate over how Medina answered the question. Medina claims he answered by saying, 
“No, you do not kill women and children.  You must use common sense.  If they have a 
weapon and are trying to engage you, then you can shoot back, but you must use common 
sense.”123  Many of the soldiers tell a different story.  Sergeant Hodges remembers it this 
way: “The order that was given was to kill everyone in the village.  Someone asked if that 
mean the women and children.  And the order was: kill everyone in the village.  Because 
the people that were in the village – the women, the kids, the old men – were VC….  It 
was quite clear that on one was to be spared in that village.”124 Flynn recalled Medina’s 
answer as “Kill everything that moves.”125 In fact, at Calley’s court martial, twenty-one 
members of Charlie Company testified that Medina had ordered the company to kill 
everyone in the village.126 
The debate over whether or not Medina had spoken the order to kill everyone in 
the village is far less important than the three months of brutality towards the Vietnamese 
people that the members of Charlie Company had already witnessed and taken part in.  
By then they would have felt authorized, even expected, to kill indiscriminately in My 
122 Bilton, Four Hours In My Lai 98 
123 Bilton, Four Hours In My Lai 98 
124 Bilton, Four Hours In My Lai 99 
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Lai regardless of whether or not the question about the women and children never been 
asked. They were a group of teenagers who, for the most part had volunteered for active 
duty in a combat zone.  They had been trained from the beginning to shoot at targets 
reflexively, without thinking. They had been picked off by mines, booby traps, and 
snipers, and they were scared and frustrated.  They were operating among people they did 
not understand, and whom they were deeply suspicious of. They knew that the lives of 
the Vietnamese mattered little to the Army, as they had seen their commanders use 
bombs, artillery, and napalm to kill civilians indiscriminately.  They had walked among 
charred corpses in other villages. Some had taken part in the torture of prisoners and the 
sexual abuse of women, and felt an intoxicating power over other people.  They had been 
encouraged to get high body counts, and they knew that “if it’s dead and Vietnamese, it’s 
VC”. And they had machine guns.  Now they were told this was their chance to get 
revenge. 
At 7:15 am the next morning Charlie Company loaded onto flights of helicopters 
and was ferried over the treetops of Quang Ngai to its landing zone at My Lai, fifteen 
minutes away by air.127  If Charlie Company took any hostile fire that day, it was at the 
landing zone. The helicopter pilots told the men it was a “hot” LZ, so as the choppers 
touched down, door gunners and infantrymen alike poured suppressing fire into the 
perimeter.  Squad leader Lawrence La Croix recalls the confusion: “There were rounds 
127 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 116 
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zinging all around. It’s hard to tell where they were coming from at that point.  We hit 
the ground and almost immediately started firing into the village area.”128 
It is unclear exactly what happened in the moments after Charlie Company left 
the landing zone. Charlie Company moved into the hamlet unopposed by any hostile 
forces, breaking apart into platoons, squads, and fire teams.129  The soldiers were on 
guard, but encountered only unarmed civilians as they advanced.  Charlie Company 
immediately began ransacking My Lai, shooting animals and any Vietnamese that ran130. 
Historian Michael Bilton reports that the massacre started something like this: “Soldiers 
yelled inside small dwellings for people to come out…  If there was no answer, they 
threw grenades into the shelters and bunkers. Others didn’t bother to find out if the 
bunkers were empty and threw the grenades in regardless.”131  Soon the soldiers began 
killing Vietnamese civilians in earnest, shooting them in the open, in their homes, and 
wherever else they found them.  They did not discriminate between targets, shooting 
men, women, children, even babies.  One villager from My Lai, a child at the time of the 
massacre, saw his entire family gunned down.  He recalls: 
Suddenly an American soldier came in carrying a gun.  I saw my father collapse, 
and then my mother, my grandfather, and my grandmother.  They all continued to 
fall. My brother, younger than me, only three years old, suddenly they blasted his 
head open. One shot and his head blasted onto the floor.132 
128 American Experience, My Lai
129 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 110 
130 Vietnamese that were running were considered legitimate targets in free fire zones
131 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 111 
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The killings, as well as efforts to cover them up, began early that day.  By 8:00 am
Captain Medina had radioed in fifteen confirmed enemy killed.133 
The wholesale destruction of My Lai continued for four hours, and the crimes 
were not limited to murder.  American soldiers performed many horrific assaults; beating, 
mutilating, and raping women and children.134  Not every member of Charlie Company 
took part in the killings, but most did, including the officers.  Some killings were 
sporadic, other were systematic. As the massacre took place, Ron Haeberle, a 
photographer for the Army’s Stars and Stripes newspaper catalogued the atrocities.135 
He remembers, “It was just shoot, shoot, shoot at anything.  I don’t care what moved.  I 
mean, the person would come out of a hut.  Bang, shoot!  It was just complete carnage 
that day.”136  First platoon, led by Lieutenant Calley, gathered old men and women, and
mothers with children as they advanced, collecting roughly 170 civilians out of the way 
at a large irrigation ditch on one end of the village. The apex of the violence occurred 
when Lieutenant Calley ordered his men to fire on this group, killing the elderly, the 
mothers, and their children en masse.137 
It was only at this point that anyone moved to intervene in the slaughter.  Warrant 
Officer Hugh Thompson, the pilot of one of several helicopters flying in support of the 
mission, witnessed the events of the massacre unfold with increasing disbelief throughout 
the morning.  After investigating the killings at the ditch, Thompson could no longer give 
133 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 109 
134 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 129 
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the American troops the benefit of the doubt.  Beside himself with distress, Thompson 
decided that he had to intervene. He sighted a group of ten villagers running for refuge in 
a makeshift bomb shelter, with American soldiers in pursuit.  Acting quickly, Thompson 
landed his helicopter between the civilians and the soldiers, instructing his door gunners 
to shoot the American troops if they fired on the civilians.  With the help of another pilot, 
Thompson ensured that the villagers in the bomb shelter were lifted to safety.  He 
personally plucked one blood-covered, but unhurt child from the ditch and flew him to
the hospital in the provincial capital, Quang Ngai city.  Thompson’s report of the war 
crimes was ignored by his superiors.138 
Finally, at noon, with the village in shambles and most of its inhabitants 
murdered, Captain Medina ordered his men to cease firing.  Charlie Company had 
committed an egregious massacre of civilians.  In the most heinous manner imaginable, 
they terrified, beat, molested, and ultimately murdered the villagers of My Lai.  The 
victims of the massacre included over 500 Vietnamese farmers, mothers, fathers, 
grandparents, children, and babies. The murders themselves were committed by a 
hundred American boys called Charlie Company, but responsibility for the massacre 
stretches far beyond, into the heart of the American war machine. To understand the 
massacre at My Lai, we must understand this story.
138 American Experience, My Lai
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Chapter Six 

Stateside 

There’s been no case in the history of military justice that has torn this country apart as this one.139 
– Presiding judge, court martial of Lt. Calley. 
In the weeks and months after the My Lai Massacre, the members of Charlie 
Company went on soldiering.  They spent the rest of their tour patrolling through the 
jungles of the I Corps area, fighting more skirmishes, taking more casualties, and 
eventually coming home.  Nobody said anything about the massacre beyond confessions 
to their families and friends. Word of the massacre reached division commanders, but 
they too kept silent on the matter, choosing not to send the war crimes through official 
channels. As one historian put it, “Officers up to the top echelons of the Americal 
Division were more interested in sending on favorable reports about their operations than 
in asking awkward questions about civilian deaths.” 140 
The massacre at My Lai may have vanished from all records except the memories 
of the witnesses if not for the efforts of a patriotic serviceman named Ronald Ridenhour.  
Ridenhour first heard about the massacre by chance; he had befriended a few men that 
had taken part in it. Ridenhour was shocked when his friends told him what they had 
done, and for the rest of his tour he obsessively worked to find out what had happened at 
My Lai. Ridenhour was also an aspiring journalist, and he felt compelled to bring the 
atrocity to light. However, after writing his 1,500 word account of the massacre, he 
139 Bilton, Four Hours In My Lai 337 
140 Hagopian, The Vietnam War in American Memory 51 
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decided not to peddle the story to newspapers, but to act instead as a citizen.  On April 
2nd, 1969, over a year after the massacre took place, he mailed his letter to the President, 
Secretary of Defense, and various senators and congressmen.141 
Ridenhour’s letter stirred several members of Congress to make inquiries, which 
led to internal investigations within the military.  The machinery of justice began to move 
not a moment too soon, as formal charges were brought against Lieutenant Calley the day 
before he was to be discharged from the military, in September 1969.142 
However, apart from those involved in preliminary investigations, the My Lai 
Massacre remained completely unbeknownst to the American public.  A freelance 
journalist named Seymore Hersh was about to change all that, and eventually win a 
Pulitzer Prize in the process. After receiving a tip about the charges being brought 
against a low-ranking officer for killing civilians, Hersh set to work cataloging what 
happened at My Lai. His story of the My Lai Massacre was originally turned town by 
Life and Look magazines, but he managed to arrange for its simultaneous publication in 
35 local newspapers across the country on November 13th 1969.143  The story was quickly 
taken up by leading news sources both domestically and internationally.  Hersh had 
brought the massacre into the public eye, and the story rapidly began to develop a 
momentum of its own. 
News of the massacre came at a time when the American public was still largely 
ignorant of the nature of the fighting in Vietnam.  Historian Bern Greiner writes, “the 
141 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 220 
142 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 247 
143 Bilton, Four Hours in My Lai 254 
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civilians who had been killed by bombs or massacred by ground troops played no part in 
press, radio, or television coverage – they were simply invisible.”144 As Hersh’s story 
cast light on the treatment of civilians, the American public began to experience a rude 
awaking to what its war was doing to the people of Vietnam.  The media worked to 
satiate the people’s appetite for more information about not only what had happened at 
My Lai, but what was happening every day in Vietnam.  At this point the most important 
piece of the My Lai story, the irrefutable evidence which could not be ignored, came into 
play – the pictures. The photographer, Ronald Haeberle, who had accompanied Charlie 
Company into My Lai, sold his photographs that depicted the massacre as it unfolded.  
The graphic images appeared in a Cleveland newspaper, then national television news 
broadcasts, then Life magazine.145 
Soon, My Lai was everywhere. According to historian James S. Olson, “the 
pictures become almost ubiquitous. And they symbolized evil. And the more they’re 
shown, the more difficult it is to defend what happened at My Lai, or even to look at 
whatever extenuating circumstances might have been…”146  The pictures did more than 
prove Hersh’s story, they made it real. The American public was forced, over and over, 
to look at the terrified faces of the My Lai villagers, and at the mangled bodies of women 
and children their own soldiers had killed. Haeberle’s pictures forced America to reckon 
with the massacre, and with the Vietnam War itself.  
144 Greiner, War Without Fronts 3 
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With the American public reeling from news of the war crime, the military had to 
answer for how the massacre could have happened in the first place, as well as who had 
been responsible for covering it up. Two weeks after Hersh’s story first appeared in 
newspapers, the military announced the formation of a special commission to investigate 
the massacre and the cover up, and Calley’s trial was put on hold. 147 
For the next three and a half months the commission, led by Lieutenant General 
William R. Peers, painstakingly reconstructed the events of March 16th, 1968 from the 
testimonies of over four hundred witnesses.148 The commission’s report determined that 
the causes of the massacre included the following: lack of proper training, hateful 
attitudes toward Vietnamese, permissive attitude regarding treatment of civilians, poor 
leadership, psychological factors, organizational problems, the nature of the enemy, and 
unclear orders.149 Peer’s scathing indictments were softened by military leadership, 
which replaced the term “cover up” with “not passed up the chain of command,” and 
“massacre” with “tragedy of major proportions.”150 Nonetheless, Peer’s report brought 
charges to twenty-eight officers, all the way up to the commanding general of the 
Americal Division for covering up the massacre, and down to Captain Medina and 
Lieutenant Calley for their actions in My Lai.151 
Calley would be the first to be court martialled, his trial beginning in the fall of 
1970. The prosecution drew a deluge of media attention to Fort Benning, Georgia.  The 
147 Bilton, Four Hours In My Lai 266 
148 Bilton, Four Hours In My Lai 297 
149 Peers, The My Lai Inquiry 229 
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Army devoted seven full-time information officers to public relations for the trial, and 
there were not enough seats in the courtroom for all of the press that hoped to report on 
it.152  Throughout the trial Calley maintained his innocence, claiming that he acted in 
accordance with his orders.153  Media attention was not the only unprecedented element 
of the trial: the four month court martial was the longest in the history of the American 
military, and the thirteen day jury deliberation was a record as well.154  Finally, on March 
29, 1971, the jury announced they had found Calley guilty of the premeditated murder of 
twenty-two villagers at My Lai.”155  He was given a life sentence. 
The debate over Calley’s guilt was even more vigorous outside the courtroom
than in. At the end of the trial the presiding judge remarked, “there’s been no case in the 
history of military justice that has torn this country apart as this one.”156  Strong 
sentiment, especially in the southern states, held that Calley had been used as a scapegoat 
for the massacre.  This feeling was summed up by soldier from the Americal Division 
quoted in Time magazine: “the people back in the world don’t understand this war. We 
are here to kill dinks. How can they convict Calley for killing dinks?  That’s our job.”157 
A folk song called “The Battle Hymn of Lieutenant Calley” sold 200,000 copies in three 
days. The Army prosecutor who tried Calley remembers, “There were mass protests 
152 Bilton, Four Hours In My Lai 333 
153 American Experience, My Lai
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around the country. Draft boards were resigning. Veterans were turning in their medals. 
It was enormous, overwhelming.”158 
With Calley a household name on the cover of Time magazine, his conviction 
became a political problem for President Nixon.  Legislatures from five states, including 
Colorado, passed resolutions encouraging Nixon to grant Calley a pardon.159  Similar 
sentiments were expressed in thousands of telegrams sent to the White House by citizens, 
which CBS news reported was the “greatest expression of public sentiment by far on any 
issue of the Nixon Presidency.”160  The President responded accordingly, moving Calley 
from the stockade to house arrest while his appeal was considered.  When the appeal 
itself was ruled down, Nixon commuted Calley’s sentence and left him a free man.161 
Calley’s release undermined the trials of the rest of the men indicted by the Peers 
Commission.  The remaining defendants implicated in the massacre and its cover-up 
were acquitted, or their charges thrown out.162 
158 American Experience, My Lai
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Conclusion 
I sent them a good boy, and they made him a murderer. 163 – mother of Paul Meadlo, massacre participant
History is not simply a static catalogue of names, dates, numbers, and events from
long ago, because these facts do not exist in a vacuum.  History is also how we relate to 
those facts and the significance we attach to them.  It is as much about the reader as it is 
about the record. The facts may be in the past, but the story is endlessly in the present.  
The story is what we use to make sense of the world, and it has great power in shaping 
our perceptions today. 
The My Lai Massacre during the Vietnam War was an event, but also a symbol.  
In factual terms, the My Lai Massacre held little strategic significance.  It took place on a 
single operation in a single day in long war.  It accounts for a tiny fraction of the war’s 
civilian casualties – 500 among two million.  Rather, My Lai’s great significance was in 
the role it played in shaping the American understanding of the Vietnam War.  It forced 
the country to confront what it was doing to the Vietnamese, and what it was doing to its 
own young men. 
Historian Samuel Hynes discusses the need to understand war through the lense of 
human experience in his book, The Soldier’s Tale, in which he writes: 
There comes the need to bring it down to the human realm.  This is not a 
mechanical problem, but an essential one.  When I say, ‘to bring it down,’ I do not 
mean to simplify, to attenuate, or to sweeten the horror, but to attempt to make the 
events speak through the individual and in his language, to rescue the suffering 
from the huge numbers, from dreadful anonymity.”164 
163 Kenworthy, Songmy 1: Questions for the Conscience of a Nation
164 Samuel Hynes, The Soldier’s Tale xvi
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Those 504 civilians’ deaths were not somehow more significant than those of their 
countrymen, except that their killings were recorded and then broadcast for all to see.  
Hynes writes, “if we would understand what war is like, and how it feels, we must turn 
away from history and its numbers, and seek the reality in personal witness.”165  The 
American public, for a time, found this personal witness in the images of the villagers of 
My Lai. They were cut down in their homes, in front of their families, eye-to-eye with 
their executioners. Their deaths were graphic, tangible, and they could not be ignored 
away. The faces of My Lai were drawn with horror, shock, fear, and helplessness.  They 
were therefore incredibly human – more human than a statistic about millions of deaths.  
The faces of the victims of My Lai became the faces for all two million Vietnamese 
victims of the war.  They provided the American public with the qualitative truth of the 
war that could not be shown in figures. My Lai showed the American public how the war 
was destroying the lives of the Vietnamese people and American soldiers. 
As news of My Lai reverberated through American living rooms, the nation was forced to 
ask difficult questions about the war in Vietnam.  The public reckoned with the reality 
that “The B-52’s hit villages like this all the time in ‘free fire zones’ killing anybody in 
the area. Ditto the artillery.”166  If Vietnamese civilians were regularly being killed 
indiscriminately, the New York Times asked “should the facts be suppressed, the soldiers 
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who kill on the ground hung and the airmen in the B-52s who kill many more be 
praised?”167  After the story broke the New York Times wrote: 
What about the whole moral basis of United States involvement?  President 
Johnson… insistently proclaimed the United States intervention was simply to 
give the South Vietnamese a free choice, and President Nixon had adopted the 
same rationale.  But how did the killing of civilians, even if they were in a ‘free 
fire zone’ give them a free choice?168 
There were also questions about how the war was affecting American GIs.  One 
column asked, “was this brutal war brutalizing America’s young draftees?”169  Who was 
really to blame for the massacre -“the men who killed the people in the village, the 
officers who gave the orders to kill them, or the ‘system’ of war which trapped them
all?”170  My Lai provoked many more questions than it did answers, but it clearly caused 
the American public to examine the moral implications of the Vietnam War more closely 
than it had before. As the American public came to understand that the massacre at My 
Lai represented the exception rather than the rule in Vietnam, it was difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that responsibility for the massacre rested largely with the United States itself, 
rather than with Charlie Company alone.   
Phillip Caputo’s Vietnam War story ends with his own implication in a war crime, 
the killing of two Vietnamese civilians named Le Dung and Le Du.  He discusses how
the circumstances experienced by soldiers led to such killings:
I drew my own conclusion: the explanatory or extenuating circumstances was the 
war. The killings had occurred in war. They had occurred, moreover, in a war 
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whose sole aim was to kill the Viet Cong, a war in which those ordered to do the 
killing often could not distinguish the Viet Cong from civilians, a war in which 
civilians in ‘free-fire zones’ were killed every day by weapons fare more horrible 
than pistols or shotguns. The deaths of Le Dung and Le Du could not be 
divorced from the nature and conduct of the war. They were an inevitable 
product of the war.171 
Through My Lai, the American public saw that indiscriminate killings across Vietnam
were, as Caputo put it, inevitable products of the war, rather than the crimes of individual 
soldiers alone. 
It was the nation that put guns in their hands, the nation that indicated that making 
distinctions between civilians and combatants was unimportant, and the nation that then 
turned a blind eye and demanded bodies.  The nation created circumstances in which 
committing evil acts was very easy to do, and even unwittingly encouraged such acts.  
The confused and frustrated young men only had to pull the trigger. 
Yet for all the symbolic importance My Lai held during the war, it is becoming 
little more than a footnote in how we remember Vietnam.  Historian Michael Bilton 
suggests: 
My Lai is now almost completely forgotten, erased almost entirely from the 
national consciousness. What was once an image of incandescent horror has 
become at most a vague recollection of something unpleasant that happened 
during the Vietnam War.  Even in the newspapers of the time, a process of eclipse 
can be traced clearly. What was first a “massacre” quickly became a “tragedy” 
and was then referred to as an “incident”.172 
My Lai has little place at all in the prominent American histories of the Vietnam War.  
George Herring devoted two sentences to the massacre in his book, America’s Longest 
171 Caputo, A Rumor of War 323 
172 Bilton, Four Hours In My Lai 4 
56 

  
 
 
 
                                                 
War, published in 1979.  Both published in 1983, Stanley Karnow gave My Lai four 
sentences in Vietnam: A History, and Arnold Isaac another two in Without Honor: Defeat 
in Vietnam and Cambodia. In 1991, Marilyn B. Young wrote two paragraphs about My 
Lai in The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990.  The massacre received two paragraphs in each 
America’s Vietnam War, by Elizabeth Becker, and A Time for War by Robert 
Schulzinger, published in 1992 and 1999, respectively. The Columbia History of the 
Vietnam War, published in 2011, discusses the massacre for only two sentences.  All told 
in over 2,500 pages representing the main body of American histories of the Vietnam
War, the My Lai Massacre was discussed in only six paragraphs and eight sentences.
Marilyn B. Young commented, “the comfortable paradigm of the nation’s 
history…had no more room for My Lai than it had for the genocide of the American 
Indians, for slavery, for the conquest of the Philippines, or the persistence of poverty and 
inequality.173  The My Lai Massacre, for all the questions and consideration it provoked, 
was ultimately too uncomfortable to remain a part of the national consciousness.  If My 
Lai is forgotten, its lessons are lost with it.   
My Lai is the war story from Vietnam that can teach us the most.  It gives us the 
chance to understand what this war was like, and how it felt.  It provides a window into 
humanity at its worst.  It shows us how innocence can be destroyed, and the brutality that 
average nineteen-year old American boys are capable of.  It illuminates and tragedy and 
injustice of all war, and it tells us about the dangers of hubris.  If we remember these 
173 Young, The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990 
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lessons, we can in some way redeem the victims of the My Lai Massacre, soldier and 
civilian alike, by refusing to let history repeat itself.
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